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Abstract How is Nigeria’s failure to fulfil its obligations as a signatory of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to be
appreciated or even resolved? Answers to this are sought through a seminal criti-
cism of human rights, namely, Simone Weil’s 1942 essay Human Personality. Weil
questioned the ability of human rights concepts to cause the powerful to develop the
emotional dispositions of empathy for those who suffer. Weil’s insights provide a
convincing explanation that the indifference of Nigerian authorities towards the
Convention may be accounted for by the weakness of human rights discourse to
foster human capacity for empathy and care for those who suffer. Weil’s criticisms
will serve as a point of departure for a particular way to circumvent this inadequacy
of human rights discourse to achieve disability justice in Nigeria through other
means. I argue that Weil, through her concept of attention, grappled with and offers
a consciousness of suffering and vulnerability that is not only uncommon to existing
juridical human rights approaches, but is achievable through the active participation
in the very forms of suffering and vulnerability in which amelioration is sought. To
provide empirical content to this argument, I turn to a short-lived initiative of the
Nigerian disability movement, which if ethico-politically refined and widely
applied, can supply an action-theoretical grounding for and be combined with
Weil’s work to elevate agitations for disability justice above human rights to the
realm of human obligations.
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Introduction
The disparity between Nigeria’s ratification and implementation of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is an invitation to
reassess the efficacy or even the value of the ways in which those in positions of
authority internalise human rights norms. By internalisation, I mean the ways in
which moral agents absorb or assimilate international human rights norms,
principles, beliefs and values, not only so that they become part of their personal
and institutional characteristics, but also how the norms, principles, beliefs and
values enable the moral agents to foster the human capacity to empathise with or
care for those whose human rights have been violated. Understandably, internal-
isation as defined here depends on an understanding of human rights not simply as
claims, entitlements or protections against the state, but also as a set of concepts that
facilitate the mutual, even though occasionally asymmetrical, recognition of one
person by another (Douzinas 2000, pp. 264–280).
Simone Weil’s (1909–1943) writings are a particularly helpful way of assessing
whether individuals, not only those in positions of authority but also members of
society, can rely on human rights to develop dispositions that enable them to
empathise with those who suffer. Weil argued that human rights are not at all
helpful in this respect. She equated the effect of relying on human rights as an
action-guiding principle to a type of ethical blindness to various forms of human
suffering and vulnerability. The problems with human rights, for Weil, is that they
are associated with a form of liberal essentialism, which misreads the sacredness of
human beings; misinterprets and commodifies deep cries of human suffering;
antagonises individuals; and prioritises a sort of emotional distance or detachment
as a precondition for the amelioration of human suffering and vulnerability. Weil is
suggesting, contrarily, that the capacity to recognise and respond to human suffering
and vulnerability is contingent on a perceptual and participatory perspective—a
particular form of attention—that cannot be effectively achieved without love and
empathy.
Weil’s insights will be placed in conversation and critical engagement with
international legal theories that, directly or indirectly, demonstrate how internalising
human rights norms is key to resolving the disparity between treaty ratification and
domestic implementation. Weil’s writings are particularly helpful in showing that
the problem with the international human rights system is not so much the inability
of state agents to internalise human rights norms, but rather the inability of those
norms to effectively cause them to respond to and care for those whose rights are
being violated. In sharp contrast to the literature on international human rights law
and social change, Weil’s criticisms are relied upon to provide an alternative
explanation for the disparity between Nigeria’s international commitments and
domestic implementation of the Convention. Taking this into account, I argue that
Weil’s criticisms of human rights together with her concept of attention can provide
a different philosophical basis for the pursuit of disability justice in Nigeria. In
doing so, I offer an up-to-date account of Nigerian struggles for disability justice
that is accessible to non-African audiences.
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In the following section, I analyse Weil’s essay Human Personality (2005
[1942]) to explain in detail the nature of and reasons for her objection to human
rights. After that, I analyse the most common reasons given in the literature on
internalising international human rights norms for Nigeria’s continuing failure to
implement the Convention. After considering possible explanations for this, I revisit
Weil’s thesis to argue that the problem may be more fundamental than internalising
human rights norms. To conclude and to provide empirical content to this argument,
I examine a short-lived initiative of the Nigerian disability movement, which if
ethico-politically refined and widely applied, can supply an action-theoretical
grounding for Weil’s work, and show how this grounding and Weil’s work can be
combined to elevate the agitations for disability justice in Nigeria to the realm of
human obligations.
Weil’s Criticisms of Human Rights
Although important to many aspects of social, cultural, economic and political life,
human rights have historically been unable to rise above doubts about their
emancipatory potential. Such criticisms can be distinguished between those that fall
short of outright rejection of human rights (but which question certain assumptions
that underpin them) and those that dismiss outright their emancipatory potential.
Those that criticise the individualistic or egoistic basis (Douzinas 2000), the natural
basis (Bentham 1987 [1843], p. 53) or the legal basis (Sen 2004, p. 326) of human
rights, or criticise the hierarchy assumed by civil and political rights over social,
economic and cultural rights (Nickel 2005), tend to fall into the former category.
Cultural relativists (American Anthropological Association 1947; Engle 2001) of
various persuasions, and Karl Marx’s (2007 [1844]) famous criticisms that human
rights promote a kind of alienated and bourgeois individual, fall into the latter
category. Although Weil’s criticisms of human rights in her essay Human
Personality belong to the latter category, her criticisms can be distinguished for
their originality in several aspects, including the questions they raise about the
ideals and freedoms intrinsic to human rights. No-one, including Marx, achieved
this quite like Weil. Marx shares with Weil an interest in accounting for the
consequences of the possessively individualistic nature of human rights claims.
However, the uniqueness of Weil’s criticisms is discernible through her overall
objective of showing the ethical limitations of human rights claims in identifying
and articulating significant cries of injustice. Weil’s writings are also unique in that
she expresses herself strongly against collective arrangements, and so she is unlikely
to endorse Marx’s emphasis on community—a concept that resonates with some
versions of the cultural relativism literature—in his criticisms of human rights.
Weil did not write extensively about human rights; neither was her work focused
on disability. As will become clearer below, Weil’s objection to a kind of liberal
essentialism that eschews particularity could easily apply to persons with disability,
not only because of the diverse meanings of the term ‘disability’, but also because of
the degree of sensitivity invited by reference to it. To the extent that some kinds of
disability may entail some form of human suffering (Thomson-DeVeaux 2011,
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p. 113), Weil’s overriding emphasis on ‘affliction’ in her writings may be an aid to
escape such difficulties raised by reference to the term ‘disability’, even though
reference to ‘affliction’ raises problems of its own (Springsted 1986, pp. 29–30). In
the present article, references to affliction or human suffering are neither insensitive
to the diversity of disability, nor do they equate all forms of disability with affliction
or human suffering. Although Weil did not write widely about human rights,
nevertheless, against conventional wisdom she offered a derisive attack on them in
Human Personality. In her essay, Weil argues that human rights as concretised in
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 1789, particularly because
of their foundations in the concept of human personality, are incapable of serving as
a standard of public morality that can be relied upon to grasp the sacredness of each
person in such a way that make them objects of moral recognition and respect. As
Weil puts it: ‘[T]he notion of rights, which was launched into the world in 1789, has
proved unable, because of its intrinsic inadequacy, to fulfil the role assigned to it’
(2005, p. 71), and ‘[R]elying almost exclusively on this notion, it becomes
impossible to keep one’s eyes on the real problem’ (2005, p. 83).
Weil’s criticisms of human rights are mediated through the concept of
personalism, the liberal foundation of the individual, one that is naturally endowed
with certain properties, inclusive of inalienable rights. Although personalism has its
origins in Emmanuel Mounier’s (Dietz 1988, p. 131) work, Weil’s criticisms appear
to be directed at Jacques Maritain’s version of the concept, which he defined as the
‘metaphysical centre’ (Springsted 1993, p. 169), that is, the inviolable attribute of
human dignity and human being. Weil is questioning the essentialism that underlies
liberalism, which has a way of abstracting human beings from concrete reality and
simultaneously denying the richness, diversity and pluralism that is a characteristic
of human being. Personalism is not only unable to conceive personhood non-
essentially, it is also ill-equipped to understand persons as comprehensively, but
equally as diversely, as possible. This is also why, as I show below, Weil objects to
the categorisation of human beings. Apart from being another symptom of
personalism, this categorisation is also why she gives primacy to the concept of
attention as a means through which human beings can be appreciated independently
of preconceptions.
Therefore, Weil’s fundamental objection to human rights, particularly as a
standard of public morality, lies on its erroneous understanding of the sanctity of
human nature, which contributes to its inability to grasp the profound dimension of
human suffering. Because human rights are founded on this notion of personalism,
they are unable to convey or articulate intricate cries of human suffering. Weil
suggests that human suffering can be comprehended not by an appeal to human
personality—a sort of essentialist feature of individuals—but rather by appealing to
what is impersonal in them. Impersonality, as such, is key to grasping the ‘cry of
sorrowful surprise’ (Weil 2005, p. 74) that often results from the infliction of harm.
She says that what is impersonal in all of us, regardless of who we are or what we
may have done, is the incipient anticipation that good (not evil) will be done to us. It
is this ‘childlike and unchanging expectation’ (2005, p. 72) of the good that opens
our hearts and minds to human sacredness and is conspicuously absent from or
irreducible to an agitation for a human right.
O. Onazi
123
Part of the reason why human rights are unable to grasp the profound notion of
human suffering is their intrinsic commercial orientation, which causes them to
come across as insincere or as superficial claims. In this sense, human rights, to use
Weil’s analogy, are like ‘the motive which prompts a little boy to watch jealously to
see if his brother has a slightly larger piece of cake’ (2005, p. 72). Human rights are
only helpful to a farmer who is being intimidated to sell his eggs at a minimum price
and ill-suited for ‘real problems’ (2005, p. 83). Her perception is partly because of
the common association between human rights and commercial legal transactions or
relationships, particularly property and contractual legal claims and counter-claims.
The effect of this is three-fold. First, because they are symptomatic of claims of
traders in a marketplace or parties to a particular commercial dispute, human rights
amplify the level of antagonism and envy among individuals. This is made all the
more possible by the contentious language or tone in which they are asserted. Weil
writes that ‘when this tone is adopted, it must rely upon force in the background, or
else it will be laughed at’ (2005, p. 81). To assert a human right claim, to say ‘I have
the right…’ or ‘you have no right to’ (2005, p. 83) is ‘analogous to a declaration of
war’ (Onazi 2013, p. 52), a declaration which not only marks the beginning of
hostilities, but also marks the irreversible dissolution of a relationship between
associates (Waldron 1988).
Second, a related and more significant consequence of the inimical nature of
human rights claims is that they are inhospitable to empathic exchanges between
disputing parties, including affectionate interpretations of human rights concepts.
As Weil says, human rights claims deny ‘the impulse of charity on both sides’ (Weil
2005, p. 83). Here, Weil’s reference to charity goes against the often derisory
interpretations of the concept, which frequently present it as the antithesis to
equality by demonstrating its equivalence to an almost extinct tradition of justice
due to the emergence of eighteenth-century notions of natural rights. Owing to the
rise and dominance of ancient Roman law (rather than liberalism), natural rights,
which gave primacy to property rights, emerged as substitutes to the Greek and
Christian tradition of justice that was dictated by the ‘surfeit of love’ (2005, p. 83).
Charity, Weil says, is ‘to love human beings insofar as they are nothing. That is to
love them as God does’ (Weil 2009, Appendix p. 19). In saying this, Weil would
accept that charitable acts can be motivated for the very wrong reasons. As will be
discussed in more detail in the present article in the section ‘Revisiting Nigeria’,
Weil would no doubt agree that when the act of helping is wrongly motivated, it is
‘like a sort of purchase. It buys the sufferer’ (2009, p. 90).
A third consequence of the commercial nature of human rights claims, and the
ethical blindness resulting from the concept of personalism, is their inability to
intricately assist, grasp or convey the most silent cries of injustice. This is illustrated
in Weil’s analogy of labourers who are maligned for their work. She asks what
specific action the labourers would take if this were to occur. Weil answers as
follows: the labourers are unlikely to appeal to their ‘personal rights’ (Weil 2005,
p. 80). Instead, they would forcefully resist the degradation of their labour, a kind of
resistance that is not motivated by an ‘economic demand’ (2005, p. 80), but rather
by
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an impulse from the depth of their being, fierce and desperate like a young girl
who is being forced into a brothel; and at the same time it would be a cry of
hope from the depth of their heart. (2005, p. 80)
Weil is highlighting a unique perception of justice symptomatic of human rights-
based claims, which either diminish and equate the nature of the deprivation of the
labourer or the defilement of the girl with monetary claims. In doing so, Weil wants
us to understand that ‘the notion of rights is linked with the notion of sharing out, of
exchange, of measured quantity. It has commercial flavour, essentially evocative of
legal claims and arguments’ (2005, p. 81). In effect, human rights commodify their
grievances in the sense that the girl or the labourers must vigorously bargain for
recognition of their human rights, just as the devil bargains […] ‘for the soul of
some poor wretch, and someone, moved by pity, should step in and say to the devil:
‘‘It is a shame for you to bid so low; the commodity is worth at least twice as
much’’’ (2005, p. 80).
Although the profound nature of injustice particularly suffered by the girl is
difficult to discern or effectively convey, even by the girl herself, it is even more
difficult to articulate by ‘professionals of speech’ (2005, p. 80). Weil is not only
touching on the difficulty of interpreting and conveying deep cries of injustices
through linguistic mediums (except those—as will be demonstrated in the section
‘Revisiting Nigeria’—that allow the cultivation of a kind of attentive love), but she
is also suggesting that the juridification of human rights obscures the discernment
and articulation of injustices (2005, p. 81). This interpretation is evident from her
depiction of human rights as synonymous with ‘legal claims and arguments’ (2005,
p. 81) and from one of Weil’s most frequently cited passages:
Whenever a man cries inwardly: ‘Why am I being hurt?’ harm is being done to
him. He is often mistaken when he tries to define the harm, and why and by
whom it is being inflicted on him. But the cry itself is infallible. The other cry,
which we hear so often: ‘Why has some-body else got more than I have?’
refers to rights. We must learn to distinguish between the two cries and to do
all that is possible, as gently as possible, to hush the second one, with the help
of a code of justice, regular tribunals, and the police. Minds capable of solving
problems of this kind can be formed in a law school. But the cry ‘Why am I
being hurt?’ raises quite different problems, for which the spirit of truth,
justice, and love is indispensable. (2005, p. 93)
Although this passage is open to several interpretations, it most obviously shows
that the concept of justice is open to two main and independent connotations
depending on whether it emerges from a ‘childlike and unchanging expectation’
(2005, p. 72) or a cry for the good, or as the basis of a human rights claim. An
agitation for a human right, most likely for all the reasons discussed above, is less
demanding and can easily be appeased by professionals of speech, that is, minds
formed in laws schools (2005, p. 93) together with ‘a code of justice, regular
tribunals, and the police’ (2005, p. 93). It is not that Weil has no regard for
‘professionals of speech’ (2005, p. 80), but rather she may be suggesting that the
juridification of human rights often works against the poor and vulnerable, which
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she witnessed first-hand in many courts in Marseilles (Springsted 1993, p. 171).
Although the poor were accorded with the best procedural standards of justice, this
neither resulted in the comprehension of their suffering nor provided remedies to
their grievances (1993, p. 171).
By distinguishing between two species of justice, Weil is saying that human
rights are more appropriate to certain types of commercially oriented societal
activity. In this sense, Weil is not outrightly rejecting human rights, but rather she is
defining them within their proper limits. She is suggesting that there are things that
human rights can and cannot do. Weil is in particular saying that for more serious
issues, especially those that raise profound cries of injustice, human rights discourse
would simply be inappropriate. Only the spirit of truth, justice and love can offer
any meaningful appeasement. Although the section ‘Revisiting Nigeria’ in the
present article considers how Weil suggested this could be achieved, her criticisms
of human rights would certainly invite objections. Some might point to specific
contemporary and historic instances in which human rights have been instrumental
in offering substantive appeasement, such as the recognition of the suffering of
slaves, women, indigenous peoples and political prisoners. At the same time, there
are equally numerous contemporary and historic forms of human suffering that
human rights fail to recognise. The inhospitality to millions of refugees and asylum
seekers across the world today, the inexcusable levels of global poverty, the
violence of development (Rajagopal 2003, p. 197), the widespread discrimination of
people with disabilities, and the hierarchy given to human rights violations in war
time over violations in peace time (Baxi 2002) all vindicate Weil’s thesis on the
ethical blindness of human rights. Her insights on the commercial nature of human
rights claims are also evident from the way in which they have surreptitiously been
used to further corporate interests to the extent that their malleability, to borrow
Baxi’s (2002, p. 132) terminology, has given rise to a trade-related market-friendly
paradigm. Although it might be tempting to interpret Weil’s criticisms as a critique
of human rights in pointing out precisely how to remedy their ethical blind spots, it
is equally important to explore the ways in which her criticisms, together with other
aspects of her writings, can inspire new ethico-political practices capable of
recognising and responding to discrete forms of human suffering. To appreciate the
need for alternatives, and how Weil’s work may inspire a particular alternative, in
the next section I explain the problems of the international human rights system that
account for the failure to implement the Convention in Nigeria.
Disability Human Rights in Nigeria
Along with the millions of disabled persons around the world, an estimated 19
million Nigerians (Cornelsen 2012, p. 3) with a variety of disabilities rely on the
promise of the Convention, not only to guarantee their human rights, but also to
counter the exclusions and injustices of their national legal system. The potential of
the Convention, as with the international human rights system in general, is
paradoxically contingent on the degree to which the human rights of persons with
disability are effectively protected and enforced in the national legal system. A well-
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known and general problem with the protection of human rights is the inability to
replicate domestic enforcement mechanisms in the international sphere. Traditional
notions of state sovereignty remain resilient, and formidable barriers against
achieving universal human rights because an effective international enforcement of
human rights has never really materialised. Part of the problem is the lack of
agreement or clarity on what international enforcement means. Enforcement means
different things, ranging from the use of, or threat of the use of, moderate or extreme
armed force, to economic or other types of sanctions, as well as other coercive
measures and forms of persuasion (Alston and Goodman 2013, pp. 689–690).
Indeed, at the global level, and to a large extent locally, moral persuasion by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), the media and human rights activists is still a
powerful and effective tool for enforcing human rights. It is arguably the power of
morality and not the effectiveness of the international legal enforcement system that
explains why the struggles for disability justice in Nigeria, and across the globe, are
now exclusively carried out in reference to human rights.
The views above are by no means universal. The significance of the Convention,
which formally came into force on 3 May 2008, is located in its potential for legal
enforcement (Stein and Lord 2008) rather than the moral weight of human rights.
Although persons with disability generally could rely on protections afforded by the
core international human rights treaties, the Convention and its Optional Protocol is
novel for introducing justiciable disability human rights. The emergence of the
Convention, which culminated years of activism by the global disability movement
(Meekosha and Soldatic 2011, p. 1386), now potentially offers protection to an
estimated one billion people who live with disability (World Health Organization
2011, p. xi). The Convention is notable for breaking the hold of medical perceptions
of and approaches to disability by moving discourse in this context to the social
model. The Convention is currently made up of 185 state parties, 85 of which are
signatories to the Optional Protocol. The Convention refers to persons with
disabilities as ‘those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory
impairments’ (Article 1) that obstruct equal participation in society and contains 47
comprehensive provisions collectively seeking ‘to promote, protect and ensure the
full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by persons
with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity’ (Article 1).
The Convention is founded on the ‘respect for inherent dignity, individual
autonomy including the freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of
persons’ (Article 3a) as one of its eight general principles. Other principles include
non-discrimination; full and effective participation and inclusion in society; respect
for difference; equality of opportunity; accessibility; equality between men and
women; and respect for the evolving capacities and rights of children with
disabilities (Article 3). Apart from dispelling questions about the individual basis of
the Convention, autonomy together with the freedom of choice and independence as
general principles are unmistakably an attempt to assert the equality of persons with
disabilities with all human beings as well as to distance itself from charitable per-
ceptions and approaches to disability justice. It is understandable why the
Convention seeks to move away from charitable approaches (Hammarberg 2011,
p. 641), especially because of the paternalism, among other things, it often invites.
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However, the Convention, if looked at through Weil’s lens, seems too quick to
distance itself from charity. Apart from a seemingly obvious misinterpretation of the
complex and multidimensional nature of responses to the complexity of disability
itself, the Convention, in seeking to assert the equality of persons with disabilities
through Kantian-like notions of autonomy (Megret 2008, pp. 510–514), fails to
appreciate the value of human interdependence as a significant aspect of the quality
of human life. The richness of human life is not defined by the ability to live
autonomously, but rather it is defined by the human interrelationships that are
pivotal for self-growth, development and flourishing. Nevertheless, there is
something to be said about its novel articulation of ‘the equal right of all persons
with disability to live in the community’ (Article 19), which, at face value, seems
appreciative of the value of community and human interdependence. However, this
appears to be undermined by the overall emphasis on individual autonomy (Parker
and Clements 2008) within community.
The Convention does not create new human rights per se, but rather it applies,
reformulates and extends existing human rights norms to take into account issues
specific to persons with disability in ways that recognise their equality with all
human beings (Megret 2008, p. 500). This is evident in its attempt to strike a
balance between, on the one hand, civil and political rights (Articles 12–29) and, on
the other hand, economic, social and cultural rights (Articles 24–28). Apart from a
precise list of state obligations that require state parties to either create, modify or
abolish laws, regulations, customs and administrative practices (Article 4a–i), the
Convention is complemented by international monitoring and implementation
procedures (Articles 31–40). The Committee on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (‘the Committee’) is given the mandate by the Convention to receive
state reports and shadow reports from disabled persons’ organisations and other
interest groups. Indeed, the participation of disabled persons’ organisations is
integral to the process of monitoring and implementation, which was specifically
designed to largely represent people with disabilities. The Committee has the power
to issue general comments and recommendations and to transmit biennial reports to
the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Committee can also receive
individual and group complaints or communications regarding alleged violations of
provisions of the Convention. The Committee consults on and assesses various
issues relating to implementation of the Convention through specialised United
Nations agencies and the conference of state parties (Article 40) respectively.
Nigeria signed the Convention and its Optional Protocol on 30 March 2007 (the
first day they both opened for signature) and ratified both on 24 September 2010.
Nigeria joined 16 other African countries (Stein and Lord 2013, p. 98) in signing the
Convention on the first day it opened for signature. Similarly, Nigeria is one of 18
African state parties to the Optional Protocol, which by implication means that the
country has voluntarily submitted itself to the oversight functions of the Committee.
Nigeria, among other African state representatives, has also contributed to
operationalising the Convention, and Nigeria currently has an expert who sits as
an elected member of the Committee. Although Nigeria has not submitted its state
party report on the measures it has taken to fulfil its obligations under the
Convention (Article 35), it actively takes part in the conference of state parties.
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Nigeria joined a host of African states that have not only enthusiastically
contributed to and embraced the Convention, but have also paradoxically failed to
implement it in terms of legislation, policy and programmes. The disparity between
this international display of acceptance, in the light of the level of African
participation, and the implementation of the Convention is bewildering. This
observation is particularly salient with Nigeria, which continues to demonstrate
support for the Convention publicly and at international fora, but has not followed
through this support with concrete implementation measures. Thanks to the
initiative of the Nigerian disability movement (which I return to in the section
‘Revisiting Nigeria’), a disability bill was drafted in 2007 and was successfully
debated before the floor of the Nigerian Parliament the subsequent year. However, it
has not yet received the presidential assent to transform it into law. Could the
indifference of the Nigerian authorities be a vindication of Weil’s objections to
human rights discourse, or could there be an alternative explanation? Before any
conclusion can be drawn, it will be helpful to turn to the most common explanations
of the disparity between international human rights treaty ratification and domestic
implementation, and possible ways to overcome it.
Internalising Human Rights Norms
A comprehensive explanation for the disparity between Nigeria’s ratification of the
Convention and the lack of domestic implementation firstly depends on a wider
enquiry into Nigeria’s general attitude to its international human rights obligations.
Nigeria’s record is impressive: it has signed and ratified all the core international
human rights treaties and their Optional Protocols. Out of these, Nigeria has
implemented only the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
through domestic legislation, even though this has not been without controversy and
is an indication of its poor record of implementation. Although Nigeria’s generally
poor record of implementing international treaties partially explains why it has
failed to implement the Convention, other factors may be responsible in the light of
the poor record of the international human rights law system on monitoring and
enforcement. Ideally, state accession to international human rights treaties and their
Optional Protocols not only should have a trickle-down effect, but ought to serve as
a catalyst for social change on the domestic level. When states implement their
international obligations through legislation, policies and programming, a culture of
compliance is nurtured, diffusing human rights norms to walks of life in a particular
political community. Legislation importantly makes the human rights in question
justiciable in courts of law, thereby placing the responsibility for enforcement on the
judiciary.
In the light of the problems of the international enforcement of human rights,
certain scholars have offered alternative explanations and remedies to the disparity
between international human rights law treaty commitments and domestic
implementation in international relations and international legal theory, even
though my discussions here focus on the latter and not the former. Two
approaches—Goodman and Jinks’s (2004, 2008, 2013) theory of acculturation
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and Koh’s (1996, 1997, 1998, 2004) transnational legal process theory—stand out in
this respect, as they explain reasons for the disparity between treaty ratification and
domestic implementation as being not necessarily the weakness of international
enforcement mechanism but the failure of states to internalise those treaty norms.
Although these issues have historically been addressed by Chayes and Chayes’s
(1998) ‘managerial model’, consent-based theories inspired by the timeless writings
of Henkin (1979) and theories of legitimacy (Franck 1998), to mention a few, these
theories have only, in the light of their primary focus on compliance (Raustiala and
Slaughter 2001, p. 538), tangentially dealt with this issue as a question of how
doctrines and norms, including human rights norms, are or are not internalised by
states’ agents.
In response to this, Goodman and Jinks, and Koh offer unique perspectives on
how to overcome this problem. According to Goodman and Jinks, compliance to
international treaty norms by states is contingent on an acculturation, which is a
form of socialisation. Acculturation is achieved when pressure is exerted on a
particular state, and the state’s officials not only identify with but also conform to
the cognitive frames and behavioural expectations of the particular international
legal regime. Koh’s transnational legal process theory, which is offered as both a
theory of explanation and a blueprint for internalising international norms in
practice (Koh 2004, p. 344), is arguably the most sophisticated approach and comes
close to addressing the anxieties raised in the preceding paragraph. Described as a
non-traditional (hybrid between domestic and international or public and private
law), nonstatist (state and non-state), dynamic (top-down and bottom-up) and
normative (value oriented) transnational legal process (p. 184), Koh defines it as a
‘theory and practice of how public and private actors…interact in a variety of public
and private, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and
ultimately, internalize rules of transnational law’ (Koh 1996, pp. 183–184).
Although important, acculturation and transnational legal process theory are
unable to explain why Nigeria’s impressive level of engagement with the
international human rights system has not replicated those norms in its domestic
system. Moreover, both approaches do little to move away from the scholarly
treatment of human rights as formal and state-centric constructs, which are not only
structured hierarchically, but also as products of top-down international juridical
mechanisms. For instance, the problem with acculturation is not only its top-down
formal nature, but also that it is not primarily concerned with accepting the ethical
or moral validity, legitimacy and beliefs of human rights norms; it is only interested
in these to the extent that they conform to the needs of the social structure or
organisational environment (Goodman and Jinks 2004, p. 643). After all,
acculturation entails ‘outward conformity with a social convention without private
acceptance’ (2004, p. 643). Although acculturation may support treaty compliance,
without the rational acceptance of the treaty norms themselves, it ultimately falls
short of demonstrating how international human rights norms are actually
internalised. I do not dismiss the possibility of implementing, enforcing or
complying with a human rights treaty norm without actually internalising those
norms, but it is difficult to understand how this can be effective or sustained in the
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long term without being enmeshed in the nature of that norm itself, or what
constitutes a violation of it.
To be fair, Koh’s work moves the debate on internalising international norms
beyond its traditional state-centric focus, but it does not show how those norms are
actually internalised independent of international juridical structures. Koh’s
transnational legal process approach appears successful only if it is supported by
transnational or domestic adjudicatory processes, especially the European Court of
Human Rights, which Koh relies upon to validate his thesis (Koh 1996,
pp. 670–674). Although his thesis recognises NGOs and other interest groups,
which may include disabled persons organisations, as potential transnational norm
entrepreneurs, it is unclear how the processes initiated by these groups lead to the
internalisation of international human rights norms except through the already
discredited or ineffective international enforcement system. In the case of Nigeria,
as has been demonstrated in the section ‘Disability Human Rights in Nigeria’, it has
actively been involved in various transnational disability human rights processes,
but this has led neither to internalisation of the Convention nor to domestic
implementation. Transnational legal process theory, as with acculturation, apart
from taking human rights as a given, ends up reinforcing international human rights
norms as formal, state-centric and top-down juridical constructs, which elide the
possibility of properly appreciating the ability of human rights norms to foster the
capacity of state agents to respond to human rights violations.
To return to Weil, the problem with human rights is more fundamental than being
able to internalise them. Even if it were possible to internalise human rights norms,
this is no guarantee for disability justice. This is specifically because human rights,
as Weil has eloquently educated us, suffer from an ‘intrinsic inadequacy’ (Weil
2005, p. 71), which prevents them from living up to their most fundamental of
functions, namely, to ameliorate human suffering. Although state agents may absorb
or assimilate international human rights norms, principles, beliefs and values, not
only in ways that they become part of their personal and institutional features, those
norms, principles, beliefs and values cannot foster the human capacity to empathise
with or care for others. After all, to return to Weil’s insights, our responses to human
rights violations are contingent not only on the creation of institutional enforcement
structures, but also on being able to recognise and empathise with those whose
rights are being denied or violated altogether. It may be unfair to judge acculturation
or transnational legal process theory on the standards established by Weil, because
they not only have different starting points, but also different objectives. The
problem, however, is that both acculturation and transnational legal process theory
take human rights as a given, which Weil does not. It is precisely because of their
inability to vividly express cries of injustice that Weil objects to the juridification of
human rights. More fundamentally, Weil’s thesis questions the ability of human
rights texts and instruments to effectively guide just decision-making and moral
behaviour. The difficulty with reasoning that is based on human rights is that it does
not clearly prohibit unjust decision-making and undesirable behaviour. Human
rights-based reasoning cannot effectively be relied upon by the bearer of a human
right, by the judge in a human rights legal dispute or by the member of an
international human rights treaty monitoring committee to reach the morally correct
O. Onazi
123
or just decision. Partly responsible for this, we may recall, is the denial of ‘the
impulse of charity’ (Weil 2005, p. 83) between parties or an adjudicator of a human
rights dispute. The emotional distance or detachment anticipated of parties or an
adjudicator of human rights dispute is particularly the greatest obstacle to the ability
to empathise with or care for a person whose human rights have been violated. To
explore how Weil may inspire a different alternative, it is now helpful to return to
the Nigerian context.
Revisiting Nigeria: Disability Justice Beyond Human Rights?
It was called the ‘one-day disability experience’ (Okoli 2012), an event organised
by organisations representing persons with disabilities in Nigeria, one aim of which
was to present a draft legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities to the
Nigerian law-makers. However, it was unlike most formal ceremonies of this nature
because the organisers of the event took the opportunity to provide the legislators
with a lived experience, albeit for one day, of what it means to live as a disabled
person. Many legislators had their ears blocked, mouths gagged and eyes
blindfolded, while others experienced the use of wheelchairs for the whole day.
Although an in-depth study into the full ramifications of the event, including what it
achieved or failed to achieve, has not been carried out, that experience must have
had a dramatic effect on the legislators, because they unreservedly and promptly
guaranteed the speedy passage of the Nigerian disability bill. The legislators’
comportment may have been influenced by their concrete encounter, even though it
was temporal, with the nature and some of the possible consequences of disability. It
must surely have given some legislators personal insights into the types of physical,
psychological and social barriers that individuals with disabilities encounter daily in
some specific public environments. Without doubt, some legislators may have
experienced some vulnerability in realising that they could experience a disability at
some point in life, either temporarily or permanently. The legislators certainly
would not have exhaustively appreciated the condition of the disabled, just as there
is a distinction that can be drawn between appreciating what it means to live with a
disability from birth and what it means to live with a disability from early
childhood, adolescence or adulthood. However, in spite of the surely purgative
experience for the legislators, the responsibility for transforming the bill into law is
not exclusively theirs. Much hangs on the Nigerian president’s power of assent,
which, for unknown reasons, has not as yet been forthcoming. A two-thirds majority
of the Nigerian Parliament can override the need for presidential assent after
30 days if they reasonably believe it is being unfairly withheld (Mbaya et al. 2013,
p. 113). Unfortunately, though, Nigeria’s law-makers seem to have other priorities,
because they have not been radical enough to utilise this option.
It is difficult to describe the one-day disability experience as a successful event,
in the light of the protracted nature of the disability bill. However, that it was able to
galvanise law-makers to pass unreservedly the bill is some indication of its relative
success and to some extent of its potentially effective nature as a strategy for
disability justice. To understand this argument, I begin with a discussion in an
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attempt to make sense in conceptual terms of what the one-day experience exactly
is, why it may have had this radical impact, its potential for the future (i.e. how it
may be diffused to members of society), its possible weaknesses, and how some of
these may be overcome by aligning it with insights from Weil. To many disability
rights activists, academics and practitioners, the one-day disability experience was
simply a disability simulation exercise, which sought to cognitively induce changes
in attitudes and prejudices towards people with disability (Kiger 1992; Flower et al.
2007). Although the relatively small body of literature in this area implies that there
are doubts about their effectiveness (Silverman et al. 2015; French 1992), disability
simulations have as their primary objective the amplification of individual
perceptual sensitivities, particularly the ability to empathise with and adopt positive
attitudes towards persons with disabilities (Kiger 1992, p. 73). While the range of
activities may vary, disability simulations practically involve the use of wheelchairs
and earplugs or being immobilised in some way, or blind walks or being fed by
another person. The premise behind such simulations is that loss of sight, hearing or
mobility, even if it were on a temporary basis, would provide a phenomenological
experience of disability, which in turn would help participants empathise with the
human condition of persons with disabilities (1992, p. 73). Simulations can
potentially reduce individual prejudice among the participants, which can subse-
quently be translated to the reduction of societal prejudice.
In spite of the positive impact that disability simulations can have, there are
doubts, for three general reasons, about their overall effectiveness in the light of
their objectives. First, there is the lack of comprehensive empirical research on the
social-psychological impact of disability simulation exercises on participants
(Silverman et al. 2015). Second, there is evidence that disability simulation
exercises can impact negatively on participants. Apart from falsely or erroneously
depicting persons with disabilities (French 1992, p. 257), simulations have
encouraged disparaging perceptions of disabled persons as objects of pity or
subordinate, diffident and feeble people (Kiger 1992, p. 72). Thirdly, and more
importantly, apart from being difficult if not impossible to simulate certain types of
disabilities, these simulations, especially because of their ad-hoc nature, do not
comprehensively lead to a realistic depiction or phenomenological experience of
disability. Some studies (Silverman et al. 2015, p. 465) have discovered that
simulation exercises provide false and misleading information about persons with
disabilities, including values prized by the disability movement, such as the ability
to live independently.
Disability simulations can be inappropriate. There is no point in using
simulations if they are or are likely to be counter-productive, although some of
their limitations can be overcome by adopting precautionary measures. However, it
does not appear that the participants of the one-day disability experience in Nigeria,
possibly because it lasted for only one day, were challenged by the problems listed
above. On the contrary, the one-day disability experience did seem to have a
positive impact in terms of the rapidity with which the protracted Nigerian disability
bill was promptly and unanimously agreed by the Nigerian Parliament. For this
reason I argue, even if it is based on an intuition, that more meaningful changes to
the plight of persons with disabilities might have occurred if disability simulations
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had been pursued further and among a wider spectrum of the Nigerian society.
Indeed, even though this is not my argument, simulations can generally achieve an
impact beyond the question of disability. Simulations can help address other societal
problems, including violations of human rights, such as discrimination, torture and
unlawful detention. A simulated experience of discrimination or torture is likely to
alter a moral agent’s perception or capacity to empathise with those whose human
rights have been violated.
The limitations of disability simulations noted above may be an indication of the
need to have realistic expectations, and perhaps to see them as part, and not
independent, of a wider legal and political framework for securing disability justice.
To manage high expectations, it is better to think of disability simulations as an
instrument that can serve as a catalyst for a wide range of activities, including laws,
policies and programmes that contribute to reduction of prejudice on a societal
scale. Disability simulations can achieve this if they are designed in ways that take
some of the limitations noted above into account, with a view to using the tool
regularly and widening the range of participants to lead to a wider societal
appreciation of the predicaments encountered by persons with disabilities. It is also
important to consider the idea of setting aside one day or more a year to encourage
all Nigerians in all walks of life to take part in some sort of disability simulation
activity. The frequent and wider societal use of disability simulations is critical to
providing precisely the sort of praxis that can guard against the complacency often
assumed that new laws or inclusive political and legal institutions are the definitive
end of disability justice. With regular engagement in disability simulations,
Nigerians have a mechanism that will always remind them that the creation of new
laws and institutions is only the means and not the end in itself.
The justification for disability simulations is contingent on appreciating how they
may be elevated to a higher level of ethical and political significance than is
currently the case, and how this may yield better appreciation of human obligations.
In disability simulation activities, Nigerians can arrive at the type of praxis that
comes close to replicating what Weil defined as attention: an ethical process through
which individuals can actively and passively experience and ‘care’ (Dietz 1988,
p. 97) for those in need. Through the concept of attention, disability simulations can
be reconstituted into an intrinsic participatory process that offers the potential not
only to enhance the human capacity to cognitively grasp or respond to human
suffering, but also to take part in that suffering. To appreciate this, it will be helpful
to consider what attention means in more detail.
The concept of attention features prominently in several essays by Weil, but it is
in her essay Reflections on the Right to Use School Studies with a View to the Love
of God (Weil 2009) that it is given its most detailed treatment. In that essay, Weil
proposed attention as a pedagogical device, but it has multiple connotations,
including a remedy for force (Weil 2005, pp. 182–214), power, a form of prayer
(Weil 2009, p. 57) and a form of love (Weil 2005, p. 92), that is, a means to love
God and one’s neighbour. Although it is difficult to disentangle various connota-
tions of attention from each other, its significance of how one comes to love one’s
neighbour is relevant for present purposes. In relation to this, attention, the
suspension of the ‘thought, leaving it detached, empty, and ready to be penetrated
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by the object’ (2009, p. 63) is ultimately a form of justice (Winch 1989,
pp. 179–190; Bell 1998, pp. 47–54), a means to literally see that ‘no harm is done’
(Weil 2005, p. 93) to one’s neighbour. Attention can be achieved only if ‘the soul
empties itself of all its own contents in order to receive into itself the being it is
looking at, just as he is, in all his truth’ (2009, p. 65). Attention, as such, enables the
recognition that the sufferer exists, not only as a unit in a collection, or a
specimen from the social category labeled ‘unfortunate’, but as a man, exactly
like us, who was one day stamped with a special mark by affliction. For this
reason it is enough, but it is indispensable, to know how to look at him in a
certain way. This way of looking is first of all attentive. (2009, pp. 64–65)
Weil’s objections to the language of personalism are again obvious from this
passage. By recognising the sufferer only through a certain type of category—‘‘‘the
poor’’, ‘‘the unemployed’’, ‘‘the needy’’’ (Dietz 1988, p. 128) or even the disabled—
the sufferer is not only stereotyped, but also consigned to obscurity. Weil has
another reason for objecting to categorising the sufferer. She says that it enables the
non-afflicted to develop an emotional distance from the afflicted either to deny,
falsify or make the afflicted’s condition tolerable (1988, p. 128). This can be
avoided, and real attention achieved, only if the non-afflicted takes part in the
suffering of the afflicted. The non-afflicted must avoid any distance from the
afflicted so as to avoid being overcome by prejudice or ‘self-regarding motives’
(1988, p. 129) such as personal esteem, pity or the motivation for eternal salvation.
Unlike Kant, whose work gave primacy to the impartiality and distance of a moral
agent as a hallmark of superiority, Weil argues to the contrary. She argues that our
ability to address deep cries of human suffering depends not on assuming distance
between the non-afflicted and the afflicted, but rather it depends on the ability of the
former to participate in the suffering of the latter. The full appreciation of the
rational dignity of the afflicted can be achieved only if the non-afflicted is wholly
enmeshed in union with the afflicted and furthermore with the source of affliction.
This cannot be achieved from a distance by impartially alleviating the afflicted. This
is vulnerable to abuse, paternalism or the dehumanisation of the object of attention.
This is precisely what, as Bankowski (2013) eloquently tells us, makes Weil both
original and radically different from Martha Nussbaum’s (2006, pp. 156–222)
approach to disability justice among others:
[T]hey do not embrace the disabled; rather, they want to make the disabled
like themselves—they have a cool rationality, albeit full of compassion; their
religion is Kant. They are not mutual partners in vulnerability and suffering
but they are there to help from their superior position. In doing it this way,
however, they cannot see. They ‘feel the other’s pain’ but have none of their
own. (Bankowski 2013, p. 313)
Weil would not deny that moral agency cannot be realised independently of
detachment; however, for her, unlike Kant, such detachment that yields respect for
the dignity of the afflicted cannot be achieved transcendentally, but immanently
(Dietz 1988, p. 130). This is partly why she objects to human personality, because it
presumes the separation between the non-afflicted and the afflicted. Attention is not
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only original in this respect, but it also presumes a radical form of equality between
the non-afflicted and the afflicted of the kind uncommon to human rights discourse.
This makes attention difficult to achieve. Even Weil acknowledged that attention
was not symptomatic of common human behaviour.
Although attention may be difficult, Weil also suggests that it is not impossible.
Every human being, regardless of his or her situation in life, is capable of the power
of attention and love. This, however, depends on practice because attention is
realisable by those who consent to it only if it is cultivated. Attention is, therefore, a
means by which human obligations are literally implemented. To begin to see how
attention can revitalise the practice of disability simulations generally and in Nigeria
particularly, it is sensible to conclude this section by considering what Weil means
by obligations, to understand their inexplicable link to attention, and why they, not
human rights, should assume primacy in the debate about disability justice.
Obligations are eternal, Weil says, and they always have priority over rights. Human
rights are not only subordinate, but cannot exist or be effective without obligations.
A human right that is not recognised ceases to exist, whereas an obligation
continues to exist. She explains this with yet another analogy: ‘[A] man left alone in
the universe would have no rights whatever, but he would have obligations’ (Weil
2002, p. 4). Weil means that rights are always dependent on obligations, whereas
obligations enjoy an existence outside conditions. Obligations are binding on all
human beings in an identical way, even though they may be exercised differently
and in different circumstances. Obligations are unconditional: human beings have
an obligation to other human beings on the basis of nothing else than their humanity.
As such, obligations are ultimately ‘not based on any de facto situation, nor
jurisprudence, custom, social structure…’ (2002, p. 5) or ‘convention’ (2002, p. 5).
Obligations are permanent, and they cannot be nullified except in the case of the
existence of two sincere and incompatible obligations (2002, p. 4). Men and women
in positions of authority have a higher standard of obligations of the kind that
amounts to a criminal offence if they are not fulfilled. Obligations are equally
matched to and respond to human needs (Weil 2005, p. 224). Human beings are
under obligations not to violate or reject the needs of other human beings. Such an
obligation cannot be subordinated by other considerations except necessity or the
needs of other human beings. As Weil says, if the obligation to ameliorate a human
need is violated, the violated will ‘fall little by little into a state more or less
resembling death, more or less akin to a purely vegetative existence’ (Weil 2002,
p. 7). If Weil’s overall thesis is that attention is ‘an act through which the unafflicted
‘‘project their being’’ into the afflicted’ (Dietz 1988, p. 129), then it can supply
exactly the kind of obligations that currently elide disability human rights discourse.
Weil’s concept of attention, particularly the primacy it gives to human
obligations, can influence disability simulation exercises in at least three related
ways. First, at a basic level, it would help to elevate disability simulation exercises
to intrinsic participatory processes that would radically affirm the equality of all
participants: disabled and non-disabled. Weil argued that the ability to cognitively
recognise and respond to human suffering depends not on assuming distance
between the non-afflicted and afflicted, but rather on the unity of the former and
latter. Our perceptive awareness or empathy for others can be enriched or amplified
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only if we directly take part in their privations. There is, of course, a question mark
about whether we can actually or completely achieve this, especially through
simulation exercises. Notwithstanding, I believe that simulation exercises, unlike
formal juridical processes, provide the closest approximate experience of what it is
like to live with a disability. Attention can elevate disability simulations to a level of
ethico-political significance, in the sense that it can offer the much needed critical
space for participants to pause and recognise the limitations of their convictions,
ways of thinking, perceiving, communicating and acting. It can provide participants
with the standard of vigilance and receptiveness to particularity through ‘rupture
and refreshment’ (Del Mar and Onazi 2009, p. 353) and ‘defamiliarisation and
estrangement’ (2009, p. 353). Without doubt, attention is difficult to achieve in the
literal sense, not only because it requires individuals to confront their innate
prejudices, but also because it entails a kind of openness to vulnerability or to the
possibility of being hurt or wrong about one’s convictions. Attention is the
equivalent of a process of rebirth conterminous with ‘learning to speak and see and
act anew’ (2009, p. 353). Attention may be difficult, but it is not impossible. We all
have within our midst the power to achieve attention when we consent to it. In other
words, attention is itself dependent on precisely the kind of aptitude that it seeks to
encourage: it is only by exercising it that we can achieve it; practice, therefore, is
indispensable.
Second, because attention entails a unique process of ‘participatory detachment’,
whereby moral agents are encouraged to suspend their thought, to leave it ‘empty,
and ready to be penetrated by the object’ (Weil 2009, p. 63), the ability to cultivate
such an aptitude can provide an antidote to negative perceptions and effects that
accompany disability simulation exercises. The ability to overcome the limitations
of disability simulation exercises is contingent on a proper understanding of Weil’s
main reasons for proposing attention as a means of recognising human suffering and
vulnerability. It begins from appreciating how uncharacteristic it is to assist the
afflicted to the extent that those who think they possess this attribute are often
misguided (Dietz 1988, p. 126). It is much easier to detest, deny or simply
misunderstand the human condition of the afflicted. It is even more difficult for
moral agents to situate themselves in the human condition of the afflicted. It is only
the love of the neighbour (as opposed to graciousness, pity and precipitateness) that
can bring the moral agent as close as possible to appreciating the condition of the
afflicted. Weil is suggesting that attention can be either true or false depending on
the attitude or intention of the non-afflicted. The intention behind the act of attention
is equivalent to the act of attention itself. True attention is achieved through a
certain kind of openness to the afflicted that does not seek to make the affliction
tolerable. Apart from radically affirming the equality of the disabled and non-
disabled person, attention cannot be genuine if it is concealed by other motivations,
especially power or self-esteem. Attention is only genuine if it is a sincere response
to a cry of injustice. False attention, on the other hand, takes a variety of forms,
ranging from impulsively, infrequently or frequently helping the afflicted through
routine, indoctrination, social custom, pretentiousness, pity, moral virtue or personal
gratification (Weil 2009, p. 127). True attention entails the recognition of and
concern for the afflicted in their real or particular circumstances. For this reason,
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and to achieve the reflective tranquillity that is required to puncture the most
obscure or obvious forms of affliction, true attention is possible only when the non-
afflicted takes active part in the suffering of the afflicted. It is this attribute that
equips attention with qualities that can elevate disability simulation exercises to
authentic and radical transformative processes. Attention can help to transform
disability simulation exercises not only into a platform for achieving authentic lived
disability experiences, but also into a practical mechanism for avoiding erroneous
and disparaging perceptions of disabled persons as mere objects of pity.
The third point is not necessarily a problem with or a response to a problem with
disability simulation exercises. Rather, it is to demonstrate that such exercises may
offer an alternative approach to disability justice that radically breaks from the
international human rights system particularly (as illustrated in the analysis in the
sections ‘Disability Human Rights in Nigeria’ and ‘Internalising Human Rights
Norms’) with its weak enforcement mechanisms and opportunities to internalise
human rights norms. Instead of relying on human rights discourse as a frame of
reference for disability simulation exercises, the latter must be appreciated as either
a challenge to or an alternative to the former. Although some readers may find
Weil’s criticisms of human rights objectionable, her writings can be relied upon to
ground an alternative conception for justice. Unlike contemporary theories of
justice, which take the kind of treatment owed to citizens of a given society as their
starting point, Weil starts from the opposite perspective by emphasising how
citizens should treat other citizens, especially the most vulnerable in society. By her
emphasis on human obligations as the constitutive element of justice, Weil
particularly speaks to the powerful or those in already recognised, secure or
privileged positions. In doing so, Weil succeeds in shifting the focus of attention
from the object to the subject of human obligations. Apart from encouraging us how
to think or act justly, independent of human rights, Weil’s notion of justice (to see
that no harm is done to others) is both an absolute and a transcendental human
obligation to other human beings on the basis of love and compassion. It is hardly
debatable that contemporary theories of justice take for granted the significance of
human obligations. Nowhere is this more apparent than in disability justice
discourse, which is almost exclusively framed in terms of the human rights of
persons with disability. Little, if anything, is said about the human obligations owed
to persons with disability. Weil’s notion of justice, therefore, can significantly
contribute to disability justice discourse by underscoring the need to move beyond
extending equal standards of human rights to persons with disabilities to bring to
attention the requirements of disability justice by way of human obligations.
Nevertheless, it would be naı¨ve to suggest that human rights have no contribution to
make to disability justice, especially in the light of their widespread dominance
among other things. Instead, I suggest the need to take the search for alternatives
more seriously. This is perhaps the strongest message in Weil’s essay; it provides
the much needed inspiration to escape the monopoly of the way of seeing, thinking
and acting through human rights.
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Conclusion
In this article, I have pointed out some salient features of Weil’s criticisms of human
rights and argued that they provide an alternative explanation for the disparity
between Nigeria’s international commitments and domestic implementation of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. While the
human rights literature on social change treats this as a problem of internalising
human rights norms, the conclusions that can be drawn from Weil’s writings suggest
that the problem is more fundamental than what appears in the literature. For Weil,
the problem is intrinsic to human rights. The indifference of Nigerian authorities to
the Convention can be explained by the inability of human rights to serve as an
action-guiding principle that can cause the powerful to empathise with various
forms of human suffering and vulnerability. I have argued that if Weil’s criticisms
of human rights are read together with her concept of attention, an alternative
framework for disability justice can be achieved. I have shown this by arguing that
Weil’s concept of attention confers a capacity for obligations of a kind unknown to
human rights discourse and it can in turn help to refine and reconstitute disability
simulation exercises into a vehicle for an alternative disability justice.
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